1. compliance
prorm
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  1. compliance

Retention & integrity

Two obligations pull against each other. Privacy law says keep it no longer
than necessary
; financial, medical and audit law say keep it, unaltered, for
seven years
. Both are questions about time and about who may change a row,
so they live on one page: the controls that drop data on schedule, the ones
that stop it changing, and the ones that prove which of those happened.
NeedControl
drop or anonymise rows past a windowRetention
rows that cannot be edited or deletedImmutability
write-once storage with a tamper logWORM
who changed what, when, from whereAudit trail
where a value came fromLineage
the backup would actually restoreBackup verification
somebody is taking too muchBreach detection

Retention#

import { DataRetentionPolicy } from 'ts-prorm-orm';

DataRetentionPolicy.set(AuditLog, {
  maxAge: { years: 7 },          // years / months / days / hours, or { ms }
  field: 'createdAt',            // the column the age is measured from (default)
  onExpiry: 'delete',            // or 'anonymize'
  preserveFields: ['id'],        // kept when anonymising
});

const { affected, mode } = await DataRetentionPolicy.purge(AuditLog, prorm);
await DataRetentionPolicy.purgeAll(prorm);          // every model with a policy

DataRetentionPolicy.get(AuditLog);
DataRetentionPolicy.listPolicies();
DataRetentionPolicy.cutoffDate({ years: 7 });       // the date the policy implies, today
A jurisdiction declaration registers policies here
too: each @Personal(…, { retention }) and each ceiling the regimes state, so
one purgeAll() honours the law and your own numbers together.
The line: there is no scheduler. purge() runs when you call it — put
it on a cron or job queue you own, and on the managed platform the
compliance.retention-purge.7d policy runs it
weekly. The month/year arithmetic is approximate (30 and 365 days); pass
{ ms } when a boundary has to be exact. And a purge here does not reach
your backups, which is the point of the last section on this page.

A nightly purge job#

purgeAll() does not throw when one model fails: it records
{ affected: -1, mode: 'error: …' } for that model and moves on. A job that
only awaits it reports success on a night nothing was purged, so read the
map:
import { DataRetentionPolicy, Prorm } from 'ts-prorm-orm';

declare const prorm: Prorm;
declare const pager: { notify(msg: string): Promise<void> };

export async function nightlyPurge() {
  const results = await DataRetentionPolicy.purgeAll(prorm);
  const failed: string[] = [];

  for (const [model, { affected, mode }] of results) {
    if (affected < 0) failed.push(`${model}: ${mode}`);
    else console.log(`retention: ${model} ${mode} ${affected} row(s)`);
  }

  if (failed.length) await pager.notify(`retention purge failed:\n${failed.join('\n')}`);
}
Run it from whatever scheduler you already trust: cron, a queue's repeat
job, a Worker's scheduled handler. What it logs is the evidence that the
schedule ran.

Immutability and versioning#

import { ImmutableRecord } from 'ts-prorm-orm';

ImmutableRecord.makeImmutable(LedgerEntry);              // update and destroy now throw
ImmutableRecord.makeImmutable(Receipt, { silentDelete: true });   // destroy is ignored rather than refused

ImmutableRecord.enableVersioning(Contract, {
  versionField: 'version',                               // defaults
  parentField: 'previousId',
});
// An "edit" now appends a new row linked to the one it supersedes; nothing is overwritten.
@Security({ immutable: true, versioning: true }) and any framework that
requires immutable (SOX, SEC 17a-4, 21 CFR Part 11, EU Annex 11, ALCOA+,
GAMP 5, ICH E6) apply both at setupSecurity().
The line: enforced by hooks, so it binds code that goes through the ORM.
A REVOKE UPDATE, DELETE on the table binds everybody — do that as well; see
User management.

WORM storage#

Write once, read many: a record moves active → archived → frozen, and each
transition is written to a tamper log that chains to the previous entry.
import { WORMStorage, WORM } from 'ts-prorm-orm';

WORMStorage.enable(Filing, prorm, { retentionPeriod: { years: 7 }, tamperEvident: true });
// or @WORM({ retentionPeriod: { years: 7 }, tamperEvident: true }) on the class

await WORMStorage.archive(filing);
await WORMStorage.freeze(filing);
await WORMStorage.getState(filing.id, 'filings');
await WORMStorage.getTamperLog(filing.id, 'filings');
await WORMStorage.verifyIntegrity(filing.id, 'filings');
await WORMStorage.enforceRetention(Filing, prorm);      // release what is past its period
The chart is assertUpdatable() and assertDeletable() in
src/compliance/worm-storage.ts, the two checks the beforeUpdate and
beforeDestroy hooks run; archive() and freeze() are the only writes
that move the state field on. verifyIntegrity() walks the create,
archive, freeze and update entries in order, requires each
previousHash to equal the hash before it, and then re-hashes the row as it
is now against the last entry; tamper_detected entries are flags outside
the chain.
The line, and it is a firm one: the chain hash is SHA-256 over a
canonical (sorted-key) form of the record plus the previous entry's hash, and
verifyIntegrity() checks both the chain linkage and that the current record
still hashes to the last entry. That makes tampering through the database
evident — but it is application-level: someone who can rewrite both the
record and every log row after it can rebuild a consistent chain. For
storage-level write-once guarantees use an engine with real WORM semantics —
object-lock on a bucket, an append-only ledger store.

The audit trail#

Who did what, to which row, from where.
import { ComplianceAuditTrail } from 'ts-prorm-orm';

ComplianceAuditTrail.enable(prorm, Patient, {
  getUserId: () => currentUser()?.id,
  getIpAddress: () => currentRequest()?.ip,
  tableName: 'ComplianceAuditLogs',       // default
});
This is a thin wrapper over the ORM's own AuditLogger,
which is where the options, the table layout and the query helpers are
documented. @Security({ audit: true }) — or any framework that requires
audit, which is almost all of them — calls this at setupSecurity().
The line: the trail records what the ORM did. A psql session is not in
it. For a trail that binds every client, the engine's own audit (pgAudit,
MySQL Enterprise Audit, SQL Server Audit) is the control, and this is the
application-level complement that carries the user id the engine cannot see.

Lineage#

Where a value came from and what was done to it on the way.
import { DataLineage, LineageTrack } from 'ts-prorm-orm';

@LineageTrack()
class Invoice extends Model { /* … */ }
DataLineage.enable(Invoice, prorm);

// source: 'import' | 'user_input' | 'computed' | 'derived'
await DataLineage.trackSource(Invoice, 'import', { sourceDetails: 'stripe in_123', metadata: { account: 'acct_1' } });
await DataLineage.trackTransformation(Invoice, invoice.id, 'currency-normalised', { description: 'EUR → USD', performedBy: 'fx-job' });

await DataLineage.getLineage(invoice.id, 'Invoice');           // the whole chain
await DataLineage.getProvenance(invoice.id, 'Invoice');        // just the origin
await DataLineage.getTransformations(invoice.id, 'Invoice');
GDPR, HIPAA, SOX and Basel III all ask a version of "where did this number
come from", and this is the record that answers. The hook installer is
exported as applyLineageHooks.

Backup verification#

A backup nobody has restored is a hope. This is the bookkeeping for proving
otherwise:
import { BackupVerification } from 'ts-prorm-orm';

BackupVerification.configure({
  primary: { type: 'filesystem', path: '/var/backups/db' },   // or 's3' | 'azure' | 'gcp' | 'nfs' with a bucket
  staging: { database, host, username, password },
});
BackupVerification.registerBackup({
  backupId: 'nightly-2026-09-12', source: 'primary', timestamp: new Date(),
  size: 4_200_000_000, checksum: 'sha256:…', encrypted: true, retentionDays: 35,
});
await BackupVerification.verifyBackup('nightly-2026-09-12');
await BackupVerification.testRestore('nightly-2026-09-12');
BackupVerification.scheduleVerification('nightly-2026-09-12', { frequency: 'monthly', dayOfMonth: 1, time: '03:00', active: true });
BackupVerification.getVerificationHistory('nightly-2026-09-12');
The line — read it twice: verifyBackup() reads a filesystem backup and
compares a real SHA-256 against the registered checksum, and applies a
plaintext heuristic to a backup declared encrypted; for cloud sources both
results are inconclusive unless you supply a computeChecksum callback.
testRestore() does not restore: it confirms the staging database is
reachable over TCP and reports the row-count snapshot taken at backup time.
Use the register for what your real restore job proves. On the managed platform, backups and
restores are real operations and the data.restore-test.90d policy nags when
no restore has succeeded in a quarter — see Platform policies.

Erasure and backups#

A subject's data purged from the live table survives in every backup taken
before the purge. Regulators generally accept that, provided the backup is
not used to resurrect the data and the purge is re-applied on restore. So:
keep the erasure register (the audit trail entry for the erasure) longer than
the backups, and re-run the purge after any restore.

Restore into a database the application cannot reach#

Staging, or a new instance with no traffic routed to it.

Re-apply every erasure made since the backup was taken#

Read the erasure register for entries after the backup's timestamp and run
each RightToErasure.erase() again with the same where and mode.

Re-run retention#

DataRetentionPolicy.purgeAll(prorm) against the restored database, so rows
that aged out while the backup sat on disk go too.

Only then route traffic to it#

Record the restore, and which erasures were re-applied, in the audit trail:
it shows that an erased subject did not come back with the backup.
The
credential rotation and
migration rollback runbooks have the
restore procedure.

Breach detection#

Heuristics over the query stream: a user pulling far more rows than usual, a
burst of failed authentications, SQL that looks injected, PII patterns in
results.
import { BreachDetector, SecurityMonitor } from 'ts-prorm-orm';

const detector = BreachDetector.create(prorm, {
  massExportThreshold: 10_000,       // rows in one query
  rateLimitWindow: 60_000,           // ms
  rateLimitMax: 500,                 // queries per window per user
  failedAuthThreshold: 10,
  alertCallback: (alert) => pager.notify(alert),
});

detector.recordAuthFailure(userId, ip);     // feed it what the ORM cannot see
detector.getAlerts({ severity: 'high' });
detector.getStats();
detector.stop();
SecurityMonitor is the same idea with more knobs and a longer memory.
The line: in-memory alert stores, thresholds you choose, and it sees only
what goes through this process. It is the smoke alarm inside one service. The
platform's policies — auth.failed.*,
access.bulk-read.*, auth.new-country.* — watch the same signals at the
data plane, across every client, and can rotate credentials or block an
address rather than only raise an alert.
Next: Residency.
Modified at 2026-10-04 00:40:16
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