The emergency switch. Signs out every interactive, device, delegated, browser and CLI session of the account — this one too — and, with includeServices, its service sessions (databases, CI, agents); asks the klock service to suspend every device; and engages an account-scope rule that refuses every request for 15 minutes (423 lockdown), so a sign-in made with stolen credentials in that window gets a token it cannot use. Only a recovery session gets through. It is audited at alert and the account is emailed.Needs session:manage and a step-up, checked in the route in every mode: a fresh one, or a totp (or from the browser a password) in the body. A klock session on an account with no second factor needs neither — its device signature is the proof. Not under an assumed identity.Capability:session:manage, checked in the route or controller in every mode. Session:manage and a step-up, checked in the route.